コウサル = Kowsar
The more you do not have it, the stupid will be clouded in katakana and psychology. You idiots, you guys say this. I love Katakana anyway, I love psychology, 100% I do not say big things. What is Y's Spending. Do not fix what you normally call katakana.
Since the political system is over in the first place, I think that it is the cause of failure of not receiving popular people, especially elderly people, only short-term and useless policies absolutely. So we will not attack only the LDP.
In recent decades, politicians have accelerated the declining birthrate and aging society to a distortion with outlook on the preferential treatment for the elderly + measures against the declining birthrate.
There is not any future that putting all the energy to surrender the tax to the old man by tax free over medical care. It was already late when we were discussing whether a large amount of tax would be used due to politicians' old elderly votes or ten years ago, so it was already late, we have not corrected the orbit again so far I am going to politate on the same route.
At this time new creative business is born from one to the next. It is at an unthinkable pace in Japan. Of course, there are many doubtful businesses as to whether it will become money, but it is better than Japanese society where there is no brain except copying the business of another company at all.
See also : https://anond.hatelabo.jp/20170728223725
The United States of America reserves the right to assume obligations under the Convention in a manner consistent with its fundamental principles of federalism, pursuant to which both federal and state criminal laws must be considered in relation to the conduct addressed in the Convention. U.S. federal criminal law, which regulates conduct based on its effect on interstate or foreign commerce, or another federal interest, serves as the principal legal regime within the United States for combating organized crime, and is broadly effective for this purpose. Federal criminal law does not apply in the rare case where such criminal conduct does not so involve interstate or foreign commerce, or another federal interest. There are a small number of conceivable situations involving such rare offenses of a purely local character where U.S. federal and state criminal law may not be entirely adequate to satisfy an obligation under the Convention. The United States of America therefore reserves to the obligations set forth in the Convention to the extent they address conduct which would fall within this narrow category of highly localized activity. This reservation does not affect in any respect the ability of the United States to provide international cooperation to other Parties as contemplated in the Convention.
In general, the Convention applies when the offences are transnational in nature and involve an organized criminal group (see art. 34, para. 2). However, as described in more detail in chapter II, section A, of the present guide, it should be emphasized that this does not mean that these elements themselves are to be made elements of the domestic crime. On the contrary, drafters must not include them in the definition of domestic offences, unless expressly required by the Convention or the Protocols thereto. Any requirements of transnationality or organized criminal group involvement would unnecessarily complicate and hamper law enforcement. The only exception to this principle in the Convention is the offence of participation in an organized criminal group, in which case the involvement of an organized criminal group is of course going to be an element of the domestic offence. Even in this case, however, transnationality must not be an element at the domestic level.
しかしながら、本ガイドの第II章A節でより詳細に説明されているように、これはこれらの要素そのものが家庭内犯罪の要素となることを意味するものではないことを強調すべきである。 逆に、起草者は、条約または議定書で明示的に要求されている場合を除いて、家庭内犯罪の定義にそれらを含めるべきではない。 国境を越えた組織や組織された犯罪グループ関与の要件は、不必要に複雑になり、法執行を妨げることになります。 条約のこの原則に対する唯一の例外は、組織化された犯罪集団への参加の犯罪であり、その場合、組織化された犯罪集団の関与はもちろん国内犯罪の要素になるだろう。 しかし、この場合であっても、国境を越えたものは国内レベルの要素であってはならない。
After its liberation from Japanese rule in August 1945,the Korean Peninsula was divided into two: Soviet troops occupied the northern half and the US military the southern half. The ongoing US military presence in South Korea led to the formation and maintenance of “Camp towns” (kijich’on, in Korean) around the military bases, a development that has had a striking social impact on Korean communities. Kijich’on (literally, base or camp [kiji] village [ch’on]) refers to the civilian world of commercial establishments and residential buildings that have sprung up around the US military bases and cater to the needs of the American GI’s. It is “ a place where Koreans and Americans- mostly male military personnel- meet in an economic and emotional marriage of convenience”. As of the end of 1996, 37,000 American troops supported the economies of ninety-six kijich’on. The estimated number of kijich’on prostitutes over the first four decades of the American presence ranges between 250,000 and 300,000.
The kijich'on sex trade consolidated and expanded during the second phase, which began with the Korean War. In her testimony, Pak Sun-i who had laboured at three different comfort startions in Japan 1944 to the end of the war, recalled:
"At twenty-seven years of age, I was having a hard time making ends meet in Tongduch'on (the largest kijich'on just outside Seoul). I ended up cohabiting with a staff sergeant of the USArmy for about two years... One of my friends from the days at a comfort station in Japan also worked as yang-gonju, but she passed away."
An American veteran who served in Korea in the 1950s after the end of the Korean War recounted that on Friday nights half-ton trucks would bring into the base a few hundred women to stay the night or the weekend with the soldiers. In 1958, five years after the armistice, the majority of about 300,000 prostitutes in Korea reportedly served American soldiers. Some of them, like their earlier Japanese counterparts(RAA), married and emigrated to the United States as wives of servicemen.
The fact that the Korean military also availed themselves of the "special comfort unit" during the Korean War has received little public attention even after the Korean women's movement in support of the "comfort women" began in the 1990s. Only piecemeal anecdotal materials on it had come to light from memoirs written by retired generals and generals and the testimony of soldiers who fought in the war.
Characterizing the Korean military comfort system as an "unfortunate offspring" of the Japanese colonial legacy, Kim Kwi-ok called for victimized women, civic organizations, and scholars to come together and confront the unresolved issues of this historical injustice. The media reports of Kim's work, however, have generated little response. There has been no public outcry regarding the Korean military's use of "comfort women" during the Korean War or its violation of women's human rights. Korean silence over these issues is reminiscent of earlier societal indifference toward survivors of imperial Japan's comfort system, It mirrors the reticence of many Japanese to come to terms with the history of their country's wartime comfort system. As in the case of Japan, many in Korea, including retired military leaders, apparently regard the women's sexual labour simply as the performance of gendered customary sex labour in order to meet the needs of fighting men. It is noteworthy that military authorities have acknowledged that the system of special comfort units contradicts the national policy of banning licensed prostitution. Nonetheless, they have insisted that the special units were created to fulfill an important strategic end.
However, when it comes to the issue of Japan's wartime "comfort women" system, which has been redefined by the international community as a prominent case of violence against women in armed conflict, no social critic or public intellectual in Korea would dare to take the customary masculinist position that such a system benefits the economy or promotes national security. This is because the comfort women issue has been redefiend as military sexual slavery and a war crime by the international community owing largely to women's collaborative movement for redress in Japan and Korea.
Still, little critical public discourse has occurred on the legacies of that historical institution or the social structural dimension of Korea'S comfort women tragedy. Few are willing to consider the unsavoury fact that, accustomed to indigenous public institutions that have granted customary sex rights to men, and licensed by the colonial government, many Koreans did not hesitate to collaborate in recruiting and runing comfort stations by trafficking in girls and young women. Rather than deal with the messy and unpleasant complications of the historical record, Korean public discourse has simplistically elevated the survivors to heroic symbols of national suffering under Japanese colonialism and its imperialist war of aggression.
By contrast, Japan, which is unavoidably seen as the perpetrator nation, has been in turmoil over contested representations of the comfort women phenomenon and its responsibility in the matter. Meanwhile, the international - as well as domestic - trade in public sex prospers in capitalist economies of Japan and Korea despite endless incidents of criminal abuse of women so employed by both foreigners and compatriots. The social historical legacies of masculinist sexual culture and political economic realities in the two countries continue to help construct women'S sexual labour as stigmatized yet customary care labour for masculine "need".