I am suddenly overwhelmed by sorrow because of facing the real that I am writing nonsense in the anonymous diary. I am wondering why I am doing such a thing at the midnight. I could have done more productive things instead of wasting my time for such a unproductive thing. It always does. Although I am always thinking of spending a wonderful day in the morning, I finish the day without doing anything. Such stupid days make a stupid year and a pile of such stupid years are about to result in a stupid life. Lousy end can be seen obviously. I can't have any hope. I have no choice but to pour my uncontrollable feeling into the anonymous diary.....
Someone who goes on numerous pointless excursions during the aforementioned pandemic, often against local ruling, because they are hollow inside, utterly selfish, and, most probably, lick hand railings.
People that have no brain cells and can’t understand what social distancing means. People that make others life miserable in lockdown by continually mixing with others, therefore making the lockdown last longer because it fails .
A person who advocates for lockdowns, mandatory masks, school shutdowns, and other infringements on liberty based on unsettled science. This kind of person has nothing going on in their life except the sweet dopamine rush they get from self-righteously judging everyone else and tattling on people who don't trust the "experts." Usually talks about "science" a lot but has no background in math or science.
Someone who believes everything they hear on TV and other mainstream media, yet chooses to ignore official CDC numbers, such as how Covid has a 99.9997% recovery rate for those under 30, and 99.92% recovery rate for those 70+. They also ignore the fact that health "experts" on TV have told us that hospitals mark just about any death as a Covid death, no matter how they died, simply because they tested positive for Covid or were merely suspected of such.
■What I want to say
Say it in a way I can understand!
I'm not stupid!
I'd like to say.
In fact, I'm super lowkey!
You're a drinker.
Extra large and extra hard
I do a kegel, I’m kinda wild
The reason why new power companies have stopped accepting bids or have withdrawn from the business is because the days when this JEPX spot market price reaches 80 yen/kWh have been going on and on since the beginning of 2010.
The electricity market is a market. If there is a surplus of electricity, the bid price goes down, and if there is a shortage of electricity, the bid price goes up. The spot market is a blind single-price auction, which means that once a contract price is determined, all market prices are traded at that price. Even if Masuda-san bids 10 yen, if many people bid 20 yen, it will be 20 yen, and if many people bid 5 yen, it will be 5 yen.
Then what happens? Many people think, "I'm going to buy it at the imbalance fee of 80 yen/kWh anyway, so I'll bid 80 yen for it. Here is the URL of Enexchange's website, which shows the spot market price in an easy-to-understand manner.
How much is the gross profit on something that sells for 25 yen? 8 yen, 5 yen, 3 yen? Let's assume that 90 out of every 100 jobs generate a gross profit of 5 yen, which is a profit of 450 yen. If 10 out of 100 sell at that price, the profit is 550 yen.
450 - 550 = -100.
This is the impact of a spot market price of 80 yen. Imagine if you had a customer base of tens of thousands of dollars, and you have to blow millions of dollars every day for a month. I think you can understand a little bit of the logic behind the suspension of acceptance and shutdown of business.
Of course, calculating the cost of procuring electricity is not this simple. I mean, I can't write about the inside story of procurement in my business because it would violate confidentiality. I wrote what I could find out just from the spot market, where the amounts are visualized by the general public. I didn't tell the whole story, if you think about it. Sorry. It's a title fraud.
In essence, I think "don't liberalize the infrastructure in the first place" is right. However, to put some position talk into it, I think that the various things that happened in the aftermath of Fukushima and the licking at the Kashiwazaki nuclear power plant were the result of being lenient because it was infrastructure, and I think there is some nuance to that.
However, I don't think that the designers of the system anticipated this level of instability in the power supply when the system was liberalized in April 2004. I was impressed when the supply-demand crunch warning came out. I was like, "This is it! That rumored ！！！！ Supply and demand crunch alert: ！！！！！！！" I was so excited. There's no way there's going to be rolling blackouts! It's about to happen!
However, in the extreme, retailers are wholesalers, and while they are wholesalers, the products they sell are not all that different. How can you make a difference in a commodity like electricity? It is usually impossible. It's hard to add value to a product because it's all about price. Of course it's not impossible. There are plans, decarbonization, optional services, and so on. But there is no difference in the electricity itself. I think it's possible to point out that the reason why various new electric power companies flocked to the market was because hyenas gathered in the industry that was assured of a sweet deal in infrastructure ......, and that's true for a percentage of the population. I think all electric power companies are looking for ways to add value to electricity.
友達 " "Customers with Russian passport are not welcomed in our restaurant. We do understand that "normal" Russians are not responsible for criminal decisions of their government, but we have to do something already. By prohibiting the Russians to come in, we're making our contribution into the free Europe for our children." "
I'm so disappointed...
友達 "60% of our people is fucking stupid. they're lazy. they were taught that war is good. that nazis are everywhere around them. that stealing is good. they're corrupted. most of those people was born in USSR"
友達 "those West fuck just love to write hate messages knowing that we can't do anything in return. that they are in comfort. they scream "NO TO WAR", and after that they go to a happy dinner with their families"
友達 "when they wrote it, it was OK. but now Putin does everything he can to stay in power. they're frantically making new laws. so they can stay in power for a little longer. what happens now is the blackest page in Russia's history. since Russia-Japan war"
友達 "USA always hated Russia. They are using every chance they get to destroy us. if instead of Russia it was Finland or China, attacking Ukraine, they wouldn't do shit about it. we several times tried to have friendly relationships with USA and each time they basically said "Fuck off, Russians". I didn't have any illusions about them before. but now I plainly fucking hate them. Japanese are the best"
友達 "when that happened, Russian premier Primakov was on the flight to USA. there was gonna be a deal that could help Russia greatly. when Primakov heard about Yugoslavia, he asked his pilot to turn around, back to Moscow, and cancelled that deal. in Russia, it's known as "Primakov's turn" "
The narrative seems to have grown of late that the only reason the Russian forces aren't pushing forward faster and further is because of a lack of fuel for vehicles and food for its troops. This is exemplified by the discussion around "the column" north of Kyiv.
But that does a disservice in some respects to the thousands of Ukrainian troops fighting a bitter battle in front of the Russians. Yes, the supply problems are not helping Russia, but it's simply not the case that if they just had fuel they would be able to advance unhindered
There are many brigades holding the line around and inside Kyiv, providing a blocking force that is putting up a determined resistance to the Russian advances. This is not just scattered handfuls of SF and near partisan forces, this is several brigades of regular troops
Similarly, to the east of Kyiv there is something on the order of at least 8, and as many as 12-13 brigades, regular and reserve, holding a line that runs roughly to Kharkiv, down to the Donbas front, to Mariupol and back towards Zaporizhzhia.
That, arguably more so than logistic issues, is what has been holding the Russian tide back this long. Strung out their elements may be, but they're still providing a determined resistance across the majority of the front. The problem is for how long?
As much as they've been taking a toll on the Russians, they've been suffering casualties of their own, expending stocks of ammunition and losing critical equipment like tanks, artillery, and other armoured vehicles.
Even the Ukrainian defence ministry seems worried about the build up of Russian forces occuring in front of these positions and the fraility of their defensive line. Despite the stream of images of burning or captured Russian kit they've been advancing steadily this whole time
And while everyone focuses on Kyiv and the idea that the Russians are planning to storm the city block by block (which seems highly unlikely when they can just shell it to pieces from the outside), a lot of people have been missing the real danger in the east and south.
One area of interest is the Russian build up to the west of Kharkiv, which seems likely to result in a push towards Poltava and behind it, Kremenchuk, home to one of the few bridges across the Dnieper from there all the way south to Zaporizhzhia.
To the east of that, there is serious concern about a possible Russian thrust in the region around Izyum-Slovyansk-Severodonetsk, with the real risk of some Ukrainian forces being pocketed in the later
Equally as concerning, Russian forces have moved up to the area around Vasylivka-Orikhiv and are poised to move on Zaporizhzhia, which possesses the southern most bridge across the Dnieper available to the Ukrainians.
Not that this bridge doesn't need to be captured, nor even the city. The Russians merely have to get close enough to deny its use through artillery and direct fire as a supply route to their forces in the east.
This leaves the many brigades operating east of Kharkiv (possibly as many as 8) in a dire situation, where the only line of communication to the west of the Dnieper for all the brigades would be in the Dnipro/Kamianske region.
If they wait too late to try and make a break for the bridges, this will involve a running battle with the Russians across some pretty good tank country, with multiple Ukrainian brigades having to bunch together and cram themselves across four or five bridges in the region
To make matters worse, Mariupol is not expected to be able to hold for more than another four or five days, after which the forces surrounding it will be free to join the offensive north. In short, things are getting a bit dicey in the east.
They're not much better in the south, with Russian forces closing around Mykolaiv. The defenders are putting up a brave resistance, but inexorably being pushed back. Russian forces have already pushed on to the north and reached the area around Voznesens'k.
The latter course actually seems more likely as a force attacking Odesa more directly would be left miles from friendly forces and dependent on over the beach supply lines, whereas an attack just behind Mykolaiv would help support the assault there and be closer to friendlies
And again, herein lies part of the problem with the Kyiv narrative, and the idea that victory will be defined by the capture or not of the capital. If Odesa falls and the Russians secure the entire southern coast line, that is a major problem for Ukraine and its economy
Obviously, I mean outside of the war itself, thinking ahead to the potential peace. If Russia maintains control of all these areas in a negotiation then they basically have Ukraine by the balls, so to speak. This in many ways is far more important than Kyiv
Thus I think we need to temper our expectations. The Ukrainians have done brilliantly, better than almost anyone expected, but we're gradually creeping towards the decisive moment and none of that has much to do with what's happening around the capital.
Slow Russian progress there is encouraging and that's helping to keep aid corridors open to the east, but I fear people are putting far too much emphasis on it just because it's the biggest city and the centre of government. Russia doesn't need to seize Kyiv to "win"
The fights in the south and east are far more important in the grand scheme of things, and unfortunately those seem to be the ones the Russians are winning, albeit it slowly. If the east in particular collapses, that frees up an enormous number of Russian men and equipment
Men and guns that can be shifted west and south, to Kyiv and/or Odesa as required. It's a grim outlook I'm afraid, but I wish the Ukrainian defenders the very best of luck. It's possible they can still carry the day, but it looks like it might take some kind of miracle 😞 /end
Walmart, for example, will require all of its corporate and regional staff to be vaccinated against Covid-19 by October 4 unless they have an “approved exception,” namely, a religious or medical reason not to be vaccinated. But it isn’t asking the same of store associates and warehouse workers, to whom it is instead offering a $150 incentive for getting vaccinated (it previously offered $75) and paid time off.
Yes, at great cost, yes, through the tragic events of the actual civil war, because now there are still brothers shooting at each other, separated by belonging to the Russian and Ukrainian armies - but Ukraine as the anti-Russia will no longer exist.
If we refused to do this, if we allowed the temporary division to take hold for centuries, we would not only betray the memory of our ancestors, but we would be damned by our descendants - for allowing the collapse of the Russian land.
The first would always remain a complex of divided people, a complex of national humiliation - when the Russian house first lost part of its foundation (Kiev), and then was forced to accept the existence of two states no longer one, but two peoples.
Bringing Ukraine back, that is, turning it back to Russia, would be more and more difficult with each passing decade - the recoding, derussification of Russians, and the setting against Russian Little Russians-Ukrainians would gain momentum.
In what borders, in what form will the union with Russia be fixed (through the CSTO and the Eurasian Union or the Union State of Russia and Belarus)? This will be decided after the end of the history of Ukraine as anti-Russia.
Did anyone in the old European capitals, Paris and Berlin, seriously believe that Moscow would give up Kiev? That Russians would forever be a divided people? And at the same time that Europe is uniting, when German and French elites are trying to seize control of European integration from the Anglo-Saxons and assemble a united Europe? Forgetting that the unification of Europe was only possible thanks to the unification of Germany, which happened by Russian good (albeit not very clever) will.
Europe, as part of the West, wanted autonomy - the German project of European integration does not make strategic sense while maintaining Anglo-Saxon ideological, military and geopolitical control over the Old World.
But Europe also needs autonomy for another reason - in case the United States moves to self-isolation (as a result of growing internal conflicts and contradictions) or concentrates on the Pacific region, where the geopolitical center of gravity is shifting.
But the confrontation with Russia, into which the Anglo-Saxons are dragging Europe, deprives Europeans of even a chance for autonomy - not to mention the fact that in the same way they are trying to impose on Europe a break with China.
While the Atlanticists are now happy that the "Russian threat" will unite the Western bloc, those in Berlin and Paris cannot but understand that, having lost hope of autonomy, the European project will simply collapse in the medium term.
Because the construction of a new world order - and this is the third dimension of current events - is accelerating, and its contours are becoming clearer through the sprawling cover of Anglo-Saxon globalization.
Because the rest of the world can see and understand perfectly well - this is a conflict between Russia and the West, this is a response to the geopolitical expansion of the Atlanticists, this is Russia's return of its historical space and its place in the world.
No nuclear dick-waving, please. This might get serious.
Since it was released into the wilds of the internet in 1991, Godwin’s Law (which I nowadays abbreviate to “GL”) has been frequently reduced to a blurrier notion: that whenever someone compares anything current to Nazis or Hitler it means the discussion is over, or that that person lost the argument. It’s also sometimes used (reflexively, lazily) to suggest that anyone who invokes a comparison to Nazis or Hitler has somehow “broken” the Law, and thus demonstrated their failure to grasp what made the Holocaust uniquely horrific.
The response has been predictable: Debate for some people has been derailed by the trivial objection that, even if it is terrible to separate children from their parents (and sometimes lose track of them, or make it impossible for their parents contact them, or even deprive them of the comfort of human touch), it’s not as awful as what the Nazis did.
But I do want to stress that the question of evil, understood historically, is bigger than party politics. GL is about remembering history well enough to draw parallels — sometimes with Hitler or with Nazis, sure — that are deeply considered. That matter. Sometimes those comparisons are going to be appropriate, and on those occasions GL should function less as a conversation ender and more as a conversation starter.
My argument regarding Russia's behavior:
Ukraine currently lacks a strong long-range fires capability. If they acquire that, they will have stronger conventional deterrence vis-à-vis Russia and could strike Russian cities. So a military escalation would be more costly for Moscow in the future than now.
If they use force, Russia will use it to achieve political goals and inflict pain on Ukraine to alter their incentives. This could be done by destroying military units, inflicting casualties, taking PoWs, and degrading their ability to defend against future escalations.
Russia could possibly achieve this by using its standoff fires capability or conducting a limited ground offensive, which would either involve a planned withdrawal (possibly with POWs) or with Russian forces outside Kyiv. A large-scale, long-term occupation is unlikely.
These military options would be less costly and risky for Russia than a large-scale occupation, which could also affect their view of the costs and benefits. In addition, deliveries of Javelins and Stingers are unlikely to affect the outcome or serve as a strong deterrent.
A key question is how much pain does Putin believe he has to inflict on Ukraine to sufficiently alter Zelensky's perception of the cost and benefits of agreeing to Russia's demands? I think Putin accepted that he may have to use force when he authorized the buildup in the fall.
Even if NATO agrees to some of Russia's concessions, that won't solve Russia's most pressing problem: a hostile Ukraine that is rearming. Ukraine is developing longer-range missiles domestically, which is still a red line for Moscow even if they aren't provided by NATO.
I think a military escalation is more likely than not at this point. Russia was hoping it could compel the US to force Kyiv to make concessions. That hasn't happened, so Russia will likely use military force to compel Ukraine to make concessions.