Ghost Leg (Chinese: 畫鬼腳), known in Japan as Amidakuji (阿弥陀籤, "Amida lottery", so named because the paper was folded into a fan shape resembling Amida's halo) or in Korea as Sadaritagi (사다리타기, literally "ladder climbing")
The 1981 arcade game Amidar programmed by Konami and published by Stern used the same lattice as a maze. The game even took its name from Amidakuji and most of the enemy movement conformed to the lot drawing game's rules
An early Sega Master System game called Psycho Fox uses the mechanics of an Amidakuji board as a means to bet a bag of coins on a chance at a prize at the top of the screen. Later Sega Genesis games based on the same game concept DecapAttack and its Japanese predecessor "Magical Hat no Buttobi Tabo! Daibōken" follow the same game mechanics, including the Amidakuji bonus levels.
Super Mario Land 2: 6 Golden Coins features an Amidakuji-style bonus game that rewards the player with a power-up. New Super Mario Bros. and Wario: Master of Disguise feature an Amidakuji-style minigame in which the player uses the stylus to trace lines that will lead the character down the right path.
In Mario Party there is a mini game where one of the four players pours money into an Amidakuji made out of pipes. The goal is to try to choose the path leading to the character controlled by the player.
In Super Monkey Ball 2, there is a level in the Advanced-Extra difficulty named "Amida Lot" (Advanced-EX 7) that features a floor resembling an Amidakuji board, which bumper travels around the way and may knock off the player if they happen to hit them. The goal only travels through one of the vertical lines and the player must reach the goal using the ghost legs while avoiding the bumpers to not fall out.
Azalea Gym in Pokémon HeartGold and SoulSilver was redesigned with an Amidakuji-based system of carts to cross. The correct choices lead to the gym leader; the wrong ones lead to other trainers to fight.
Phantasy Star Online 2 uses the principle of Amidakuji for a randomly appearing bomb-defusing minigame. One must trace an Amidakuji path around each bomb to determine which button defuses it; incorrect selections knock players away for a few seconds, wasting time.
「In the world of mathematics, a journal’s seal of approval is often not the end of the peer-review process. An important result only truly becomes an accepted theorem after the community has reached a consensus that it is correct, and this can go on for years after a paper’s official publication.」
12 Dr. Hiroshi Nishiura is one of the few professionals of mathematical models of infectious diseases in Japan, and it is well known that his ability is outstanding. However, many people don't understand mathematical models themselves (I must confess that I can't say that I understand all of the findings because I'm not a professional of mathematical models either), so his findings and comments are easily deified. Because the contents of the mathematical model are a complete black box to many people, it makes it seem like the oracle is coming out like a shrine's oracle. Much of Japan's infection control policy relies on the Nishiura theory. So there is nothing wrong with that, but one of the problems in Japan is that there is no plan B in case plan A goes bust. Dr. Nishiura is an excellent scholar. It is not God. Hence the need to have that Plan B with the possibility of making a mistake. I am greatly concerned that bureaucrats and politicians who are prone to infallibilism will mistake science for an oracle. It is only when falsifiability is assured that science can continue to be scientific.
Mathematical models are the product of deductive methods. The deductive method is complemented by the inductive or abduction method, which is the basis of scholarship and the common sense of clinical medicine. It's a common occurrence in this industry that no matter how deducibly correct it may seem, it's actually not true. Even a huge intellect like Hegel or Marx can make a mistake by deduction alone.
I'm not saying don't use the model at all. I myself write a paper using a model. However, the model is not infallible, there are assumptions that are assumptions, and the assumptions are often wrong. Making use of Gram's stain means having full knowledge of what Gram's stain cannot do and does not understand, and Gram's stain cannot be used by Gram's stain universalists. It's the same thing. Mathematical models are also utilized in the UK, which is why Brits are very sceptical of their conclusions, and there are always counter-arguments and objections. It is a sound and scientific attitude.
15 Japan's "now" is a well-controlled state of infection, which is much better than Wuhan at its worst, or Italy, Spain, France, England, or New York at the present time. The problem is that it doesn't guarantee that it will "always work".
It is Tokyo that is of concern. The increase in reports of infection is not the only problem. The problem is that more and more infected people are unable to form clusters and cannot be traced. And the number of tests is much lower than that number of positive cases; it's too little that they only tested less than 100 people (the date of testing for the positives is unknown, but it's probably around here) to capture 47 infected people.
Again, it's not necessary to figure out all the infected people. However, it is troubling that the flow of infection, movement and clusters are out of sight. Therefore, the threshold for testing must be lowered in Tokyo. The threshold for testing varies with the circumstances. That's what I explained with the Korean example. Sticking to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare's "standards" will lead to a misunderstanding of the phenomenon itself. Already in the Kansai region, infected people have been found with taste and smell abnormalities, and clusters have been detected from there. I would like to make more use of the athletic sensibilities of these clinicians. I'm not sure "where" in Tokyo is the barrier to lowering the number of inspections, but that barrier needs to be removed immediately.
17 This conceptual diagram that everyone is looking at - lowering the peak of the infection and shifting it to the side. This is all a product of deduction, and I don't know if it's really true. As mentioned above, the UK estimates already suggest that this is not enough. It is possible that the damage that was shifted to the side could simply be "extra-long damage".
And this is the key point: the idea of lowering the peak should not become the notion that the peak must be lowered, or the belief that the peak must be lowered, or the self-implication that the peak is not happening. In a pattern of Japanese failure to stick to Plan A, Diamond Princess allowed no-guard disembarkation by changing "secondary infection should not occur" to "it can't have happened". We need to keep our eyes on reality so that "peak shouldn't happen" doesn't become "I don't want to see a peak. Even if it is an inconvenient truth that we don't want to see.
19 Repeatedly. It's common knowledge in this industry that deductive methods are complemented by inductive methods. Nevertheless, PCR is often false-negative and has little power to determine the status of infection. That's why "testing everything" is so wrong. However, a serum test measuring immunoglobulin IgM and IgG would provide a more accurate picture of the "status of infection in the population. This, however, is not infallible. It is difficult to use for individual cases because it misses early infection, which is why it misses early HIV infection.Whether antibody testing is useful in individual cases remains to be tested, but it is well suited for epidemiological studies on a population basis. Roughly speaking, we can confirm whether the "infection is rampant" in Tokyo right now, or whether it's just an unfounded fear.
As a precedent, serology tests in London showed that the 2009 pandemic flu was 10 times more likely than previously predicted. Antibody testing is often performed after an outbreak, but now is a good time to examine COVID-19, which is becoming a chronic pandemic.
The UK is even more aggressive. The idea is to test for antibodies at home, and if they are found to be infected, they will use it as a basis for self-isolation at home. That strategy is flawed because with the lockdown in place, a negative test does not mean "no self-sequestration". However, the idea is that we want to control the infection as a whole, and I think it is worth considering.
Inductive legal confirmation of how many infections are occurring in Tokyo is necessary and useful. I'm not a prophet, so I don't know what the outcome will be.However, no matter what the outcome, scientists need to accept it and not hesitate to change their thesis and move on to Plan B in some cases. Scientists have to be coherent in their inconsistencies.They may not be coherent in form, but they must be coherent in principles and professionalism. Good faith in the facts.
1 Most of what I'm about to write is no different from what I've said and done in the past. However, I have been asked the same question repeatedly, so I would like to reiterate it. We have received many inquiries from overseas as well, so we should have prepared the same content in English, but due to time constraints, I'm afraid I'll have to skip it. This article is designed to be read without basic knowledge of infectious diseases and jargon, but it is rather difficult to understand. Please forgive me for that.
2 The fact that the number of COVID-19 reports in Japan is very low compared to other countries is attracting attention from home and abroad. Is it true? It has been pointed out that the number of tests is so small that we may be misreading the actual number of infected people.
3 However, this point is wrong at various layers. In the first place, Japan does not aim to capture all the numbers of COVID-19. Whether it's administrative testing or insured care, the state basically has a testing strategy in mind to diagnose, hospitalize, and isolate critically ill patients who need to be hospitalized. It is natural that they "haven't figured it out" and they don't intend to. That's not a bad thing.In fact, the situation is the same in every country, large or small, and no country, whether in the United States, Europe, or Asia, is aiming to "capture the whole number.
The WHO is not asking for such a thing. But instead, Japan gives PCR to asymptomatic returnees and isolates asymptomatic test-positive people in hospital (wasn't it home for people with minor illnesses?). It has not been coherent in its principles. So, people get anxious because "we're not sure what they want to do". It's a failure in the press.
4 The difference between Korea and Japan is the "result" and not the "purpose". In South Korea, where the number of infected people had surged in one place, we had to focus on inspections in and around the area. If such a phenomenon (let's call it an overshoot) occurs in Japan, the number of inspections will increase. When the situation is different, arguing only on the basis of the number of tests without observing the situation is like trying to say, "That team made 50 sliding tackles while this team made only one," without watching a football game. In games where you don't have to slide (e.g., when you're in possession the whole time), even 0 times isn't a "mistake," and of course 50 times isn't a mistake.
There are many diseases for which the total number of patients is not known. In Japan, we do not have a "total" number of influenza cases, but only a fixed-point observation. Because that's enough information, both epidemiologically and in terms of infection control. There is no accurate data on how many cases of the common cold occur each year in Japan. It's also a mistake to say that you can tell by looking at the receipt data, because many cold patients (like me) don't see a doctor and wait until they are cured naturally. Not only in medicine, but also in economics and political science, data are mostly based on sampling to estimate population numbers, and "whole numbers" is an inefficient way of grasping the situation.
6 We have not seen the devastation in Japan as in Italy, Spain or New York City. There is no medical collapse in a critically ill patient, no use of the operating room as an ICU, no piling up of bodies on a skating rink with no place to put them. Even if the "numbers" are not known, it is a fact that the current situation in Japan (including Tokyo) is much better controlled than in other countries.
7 Even so, you may be interested in "Well, what about the actual situation? There are estimates. For example, Dr. Hiroshi Nishiura and his group estimate that the number of mild illnesses in Japan may be twice the reported number. The catch rate is 0.44, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.37-0.50.
8 Although the study was based on data from China, there is no guarantee that the Chinese COVID-19 demographic is the same as the Japanese one. Also, since the original study did not include asymptomatic patients or those with minor illnesses that did not require hospitalization, the number of infected patients estimated on that basis would inevitably be an underestimate. If you are more paranoid, it's not unreasonable to believe that "the Japanese and Chinese viruses are different because of the mutation" (although I don't think so).
9 This does not diminish the value of the paper itself. The model must always use existing parameters, and it is often impossible to prove the external validity of these parameters. If the underlying parameters are not reasonable, the predictions will not be correct. A model assumes a simplified world insofar as it is a model. A model without simplification, which is an adjectival contradiction.
To complain about these "assumptions" of the mathematical model is like complaining, for example, "You can't explain disease B," when a randomized controlled trial is conducted for disease A. This is a meaningless tirade against the honor of the industry.
A mathematical model that assumes a certain hypothesis should have internal academic validity, but it is the responsibility of the reader, as a resident of the real world, to appraise it in the real world.
Just as the RCT findings for disease A should not be used for disease B, it is natural to understand the limitations of the mathematical model and to be careful when applying it to the real world. For example, it would be wrong to read the paper and conclude that the total number of infected people in Tokyo is about 500 as of March 26.
11 People make mistakes. The models are also wrong. Being wrong is not a big deal. The problem is to notice your mistakes and make corrections. Already, a group at Imperial College London has admitted that its original estimate that the peak of the infection should be moderated was "wrong" and has revised its prediction that the ICU will soon fail if it does not fight the virus fairly aggressively.
英語版 文字起こし (自動生成）のコピペを、英語として読める文章にした。いくつか聞き取れていないところがあるので、わかる人がいたらトラバで教えてほしい。聞き取れていないところは「(inaudible01)」みたいに番号をふって記載してあるので、
I was very concerned of the number of the people who got infected with the COVID-19 disease infections. Then I was wondering why this is[sic](was)*2 happening. I wanted to enter into the cruise ship and wanted to be useful in helping to containing infection there.
I spoke with several people and finally one officer at working for Ministry of Health and Labor called me yesterday, saying that well you can come and enter into a cruise ship and do the infection control works.
On the way to go to Yokohama I got another call from the same officer, saying, "Somebody didn't like me. So you can't get into the cruise ship." He was not able to say who, and he was not able to say why, but certainly some power over him affected his decision and I was blocked from entering into the ship.
Then after several discussions he found another way that if you could come as a DMAT member, you can come into the the cruise ship. DMAT is the disaster management medical team in Japan and usually deals with a disaster not infectious diseases, but because of the lack of the people who could help people inside a cruise ship to get out of the ship, or the managing of people, and so on, DMAT was requested to enter into the cruise ship.
Additionally, I got another call that some people didn't like me getting into the cruise ship present even as a DMAT member. So another discussion happened then the I waited about one hour in Shin Yokohama Station, and finally the officer find a way. [He said] that "If you work for DMAT not as an infection prevention specialist but as an ordinary routine DMAT officer working under (inaudible01) DMAT doctor doing a routine job, then you could come into the cruise ship."
I entered the ship. Then I found the chief officer of the DMAT and spoke with him. I said, "Well I was assigned to the DMAT members (inaudible02) out whatever you want to say." Then he said, "Well, you don't have to work DMAT work because that's not your specialty. You are an infection prevention specialist, so why don't you do the infection control." Then I said, "Fine, I spoke with the superior of him who is[sic](was) in charge of the all the DMAT operations, and he also said, "You are an infection control person, so you should do infection control." I said, "Fine." But he said, "Well, you shouldn't be here as a DMAT member. You should come as (inaudible03) infection control specialist." He was not very happy about that while I was inside the DMAT. But because that was not my decision, there was no other way. So I said, "Well I have to do it."
So the people could come and go, (inaudible04) a PPE, off PPE. Crews were just walking around, the officers of the Ministry Health and Labor were walking around, DMAT people were walking around, psychiatrists were walking around.
Anyways I (have) dealt with a lots of infections (for) more than twenty years. I was in Africa dealing with the Ebola outbreak. I was in another country dealing with the cholera outbreak. I was in China in 2003 to deal with the SARS, and I saw many febrile patients there. I never had fear of getting infection myself for Ebola, SARS, (and) cholera, because I know[sic](knew) how to protect myself and how to protect others, and how the infection control should be. So I could do the adequate infection control; protect myself, and protect others.
But inside (the) Princess Diamond, I was so scared. I was so scared of getting COVID-19 because there was no way to tell where the virus is. No Green Zone, no Red Zone. Everywhere could have the virus and everybody was not careful about it.
I spoke with the head officer of the Ministry of Health and Labor and he was very unhappy with my suggestion of protecting DMAT people and other staffs so that no other secondary transmission would occur.
Then after several hours of talking to people and finding problems, I found a lot of issues there. For example, informed consent of getting a PCR from the people in the ship whereas(? inaudible05) on a paper, and that paper was going back and forth, back and forth with the room of the infection from the paper, by touching there[sic](it). So I suggested that maybe it's better to abandon the paper-type informed consent but rather getting the informed consent verbally would be more protective, and so on and so on.
I think I was reasonable. I never yell at anybody, I never criticize anybody personally, but I was trying to be constructive that we try to seek the constructive but immediate improvement to protect everybody inside the ship.
Then about five o'clock, the person from the quarantine office came in and approaced. (He) said, "Well you have to be out because you'll not be allowed inside the ship." Because I was inside the ship as a temporary officer of the quarantine. Apparently my bank(? inaudible06) was removed by somebody, and nobody said who, and then I was out.
The officer who offered me the job of infection control said he was sorry. Then I asked him, "So what do you wanna do? Do you want to infect everybody in the ship? It will be thousands of people who could potentially get COVID-19.
I don't criticize DMAT people. They were infection control specialists. Society of Infection Prevention entered, a lot of specialists came in, but they spent only a few days and they left. And they said they were fearful of getting infections themwelves.
I'll be out of my medical services at Kobe University Hospital for maybe next two weeks to avoid further infections to occur. That is very likely to occur if you keep zero infection control inside the ship, the Diamond Princess, like this.
You might know that there is no CDC*3 in Japan, but I thought there must be some specialists called on and was[sic](were) in charge of infection control in ship. It's not expecting[sic](expected) (that) nobody was a professional infection control specialist, and (that) only the bureaucrats were doing the jobs, completely layman's work, violatiing all the infection control principles and risking people inside (of*4) further infections, so I'm not very surprised to see many new positive PCR to be broadcasted every day.
Hundreds of people got infected and a lot of people from outside Japan decided to take the people away from the ship and bring them to their home countries by airplane and offered them another 14 days of quarantine. I hope this will be an opportunity to raise a question (about) what is happening inside the ship.
I wish all the international bodies to request Japan to change. I wish everybody to call for the protection of people inside the Diamond Princess. Otherwise there'll be far more infections for passengers, for crews, for DMAT members, for psychiatrists, for officer(s) of the Ministry of Health and Labor. DMAT members consist of nurses and doctors and that they will go back to the hospital they work routinely and they might infect their patients further to spread the disease. I can't bear with it. I can't bear with it.
wanted to be useful in helping to
from entering into the shape then after
lack of the people who could help people
ship or the managing of people and the
there's no other way so I said finding
have to do it
I looked into the several places inside
and go welding a PPE of PPE crews were
just walking around and the officers of
walking around d-mat people are walking
players people were wearing PPE and off
chaotic and some crews had a fever they
went to the medical center while wearing
myself for Ebola SARS cholera because I
control should be SOT I could do the
myself and protect others but inside
protecting Deemer people and other
transmission to occur then after several
hours of talking to people and finding
type informed consent but resolutely
to insert a shape because I was inside
people who could
completely layman's work in the bio
principles and the risking people inside
the opportunity to
people inside the diamond princess
have to help people inside the ship
As research lead, Babakinejad felt it was his responsibility to raise these issues with Harper and other members of the team, and he did so in an email. He also raised his concerns with Ito. In an email, he told the director that the Open Agriculture Initiative had not been able to create a controlled environment in the food computers, and that the devices had been sent to schools and a refugee camp without being tested to ensure that they worked. He worried that Harper was misleading funders. Ito responded by asking if he could raise these issues with Harper. Babakinejad agreed to let Ito share his general concerns. (Ito did not respond to a request for comment. A Media Lab spokeswoman declined to comment.)
Harper's optimism helps raise money, and without money he won’t be able to see this dream of an international network of food computers come true. His critics, he said, “are basically jealous because I raise a lot of funding while giving away knowledge for free.” Harper also said that he doesn’t mislead the public. He’s explained his progress in great detail in a series of Medium posts, he said. Some may have misinterpreted his vision as current reality, he said, but if they listened closely they would not be mistaken. “Can you email a tomato to someone today? No,” he said. “Did I say that in my TED talk? Yes. Did I say it was today? No. I said, you will be able to email a tomato.”
It's true that Harper didn’t quite say that food computers can email tomatoes or apples, though you could be forgiven for thinking exactly that. He frequently leaves the impression that the project has achieved, or is on the brink of achieving, an enormous breakthrough. It’s a style that has attracted the sort of high-profile attention, not to mention corporate funding, that fuels projects at the MIT Media Lab, and his willingness to showcase food computers beset with problems feels consistent with Ito’s “deploy or die” philosophy.
“You seem to think endlessly reiterating untrue claims will lend them credibility, but it won’t,” Dr. Babakinejad wrote to Mr. Harper. “By persisting in this course of action, you have been putting M.I.T. and everyone associated with you at risk and I think it’s time that you were made to face up to that and take responsibility for it.”
The food computers, which researchers have envisioned selling to the public, are supposed to provide plants with just the right amount of light. But when the light function was not working, another member of the OpenAg team said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to describe sensitive events, an engineer manually rigged the device so that light would shine at the correct level during an important demonstration.
In an email exchange with Mr. Ito, Dr. Babakinejad expressed his concern about what he said were Mr. Harper’s false claims in a draft of the academic paper, the “60 Minutes” interview and lectures.
“Up to now,” Dr. Babakinejad wrote, “we have not been able to achieve a ‘controlled environment’ nor been able to create an atmosphere (Climate control) as he leads people to believe in his talks. His claims about developments such as implementations of image processing, microbiome dosing, creating different climates and collecting credible data from bots across the world are not true.”
Mr. Ito wrote in his reply: “Can I say that you have concerns about whether the food computers have been able to create a controlled environment which would put into questions some of the claims we make about the data and outcomes?”
Dr. Babakinejad replied in the affirmative, and the exchange ended.
脳性麻痺 = Cerebral palsy
明るさの単位 = Candlepower
児童ポルノ = Child pornography
コードページ = Code Page